Mid-Year Real Estate Review With Paul Brewbaker ... update for today, tomorrow & beyond!

By invitation only

Thursday, August 31, 2023 11:30 a.m. – 1:30 p.m. Waialae Country Club Lunch & Presentation – \$30.00 (808) 733-7060, HIREC@hawaiirealtors.com





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















WHAT PEOPLE IMAGINE THE HAWAII LAVA FLOWS LOOK LIKE

WHAT THE HAWAII LAVA FLOWS LOOK LIKE






Implying that people should not travel to Wailea, Maui because of a wildfire in Lahaina is like saying that people should not travel to Waikiki, Oahu because of a wildfire in Nanakuli.




Performative righteousness is not helpful for victims of tragedy and people in the community

For Kauai, covid was not their first rodeo, Iniki not even their first hurricane! Their rebuild: timeshare, condos (securitization)




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Two distinct markets, Oahu reliant on urban agglomeration, N. Isles reliant on securitized lodging formats (risk-pooling)



Kauai's rebuild could commence almost immediately: not Lahaina's



After the Lahaina Wildfire, information asymmetry: locals know more about the situation than tourists, investors, celebrities, influencers


- Classic problem of crisis communications: lack of impulse control amplifies misinformation
 - 1. Only your first message lands—there are no do-overs
 - 2. A celebrity Aquamansplains to the world: "DO NOT TRAVEL TO MAUI"*
 - 3. A TikTok influencer gets > 2 million views: "Do not come to Maui. Cancel your trip. Now."
- Opportunistic anti-tourism denialist disestablishmentarianism does not aid economic recovery
- Governor Green: "I will try to allow no one from outside the state to buy any land until we get through this crisis and decide what Lahaina should be in the future."
- Uh:
 - (a) Check with the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
 - (b) Prevent owners of vaporized buildings from exercising their property rights?
 - (c) Understand the role capital mobility plays in efficient asset allocation?

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^{*}NBC News (August 14, 2023) (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/jason-momoa-tells-tourists-not-travel-maui-deadly-fires-devastate-isla-rcna99820)

[†]Christine Chung and Madison Malone Kircher (August 17, 2023 updated August 22, 2023), "After Maui Wildfires, Travelers Ask: Would a Trip Help or Hurt?" The New York Times

Oahu tourism shocks post-9/11: displacement from longer-run trend but ultimately reconvergence—Omicron sub-variants still a factor



Currently (summer 2023), Oahu monthly visitor days are running about 0.75 million/month below trend after seasonal adjustment




COVID-19


2018

2016

Delta

2022





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









At 15-20 percent below potential, Oahu visitor day shortfall echoed in e. 10 percent shortfall in Oahu jobs vs. 2010s longer-run trend




^{*}The difference between Oahu jobs in mid-2023 and at end-2019, about 23,000, is similar to all construction jobs (26,400), finance, insurance and real estate jobs combined (21,000), and transportation, warehousing, and utilities jobs combined (24,600); relative to pre-pandemic potential (47,600) the difference is similar to all food services jobs (47,100).

Maui visitor days (arrivals X average length of stay): failing to return to pre-pandemic trend, falling short by 4 million/year (@\$200/day)


Quarterly Maui visitor days, millions, s.a. (log scale)



Deviations from pre-pandemic trend in million visitor days, s.a.



Of greater concern: Maui payroll employment detached from 2010s growth trend by mid-2018, pre-pandemic, further behind by mid-2023



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










Mahalo Jason Momoa for that advice on staying away from Maui: that's a big, big help—weekly Maui domestic passenger arrivals



Comparatively tranquil 2010s appreciation (within ± 2 s.e.); post-covid divergence: single-family surge, less condominium bubbliciousness




Oahu SF prices had *larger* deviations from pre-pandemic trend than condo prices. Bubbles *detach* from fundamentals, but WFH is real




More movement in detrended, post-pandemic Oahu single-family valuations than in condos (in standard deviations) relative to 2010s


Ratio of detrended Oahu median home prices (logs) to their unconditional s.d. 2010-2019



"Years" April-March: mean (dark) and median (light) Oahu existing SF home prices jumped upward more abruptly—working from home



Oahu existing home sales price density functions: SF prices busted a bigger move to high side, post-covid, post-vaxx, than condo prices




Post-covid sales below \$½ mil. rose; \$½ - 1 million small decrease

widespread public access to covid vaccines began April 2021 (old buggahs had a head start through March 2021)

Post-covid sales below \$1 mil. fell; \$1-2 mil. rose sharply

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
Oahu single-family home price appreciation in 2020: distinct spatial COVID shift to exurbs, suburbs from urban core—The Donut Effect*




^{*}Arjun Ramani, Nicholas Bloom (January 2021), "The donut effect: How COVID-19 shapes real estate," *Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Policy Brief* (https://siepr.stanford.edu/research/publications/donut-effect-how-covid-19-shapes-real-estate

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
Oahu single-family home price appreciation 2022: "backwash" after COVID wave to exurbs/suburbs, return to urban core—relative prices



Some LR corroboration comparing Kona-Kohala to Oahu dynamics (arbitrage should equate long-run risk-adjusted returns, theoretically)




Looking more closely at recent Kona-Kohala median prices: unlike Oahu, West Hawaii single-family and condo prices jumped post-covid




Kona-Kohala valuations rose sharply post-covid: remote work = vagabond workers? Makes sense if condos are in *resort* areas

Quarterly Kona-Kohala median existing home sales prices, s.a. (thousand dollars; log scale)



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Of course, Kona-Kohala is San Diego, California (and vice versa)



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


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




Maui median home prices above pre-covid trend, too; a bubble? No: fundamentals—remote work, working from home—*vagabond* workers



Unlike Oahu, both Maui median single-family and condo prices are on post-covid, above-trend trajectories, decelerating through mid-2023




Conjecture: remote work/WFH favored suburbs/exurbs on Oahu, not as much urban core, but residential and resorts in Maui, Kona-Kohala


- What explains dichotomous outcome?
 - 1. Oahu (mostly suburban) single-family home median prices well above trend, post-covid
 - 2. Oahu (mostly urban core) condominium median prices on trend, not above, post-covid
 - 3. N. "Islands"—Maui and West Hawaii—both single-family, condo prices above trend, post-covid
- The "Donut Effect" apparent in Urban Honolulu MSA (literally the name of Oahu in U.S. statistics), consistent with post-covid increase in remote work, working from home, decrease in commuting
- Maui, Kona-Kohala resorts may be picking up vagabond worker housing demand in resort areas (disproportionately the location of condominiums in both Neighbor Island sub-markets)
- Corroborating evidence:* Maui exhibited only half of Oahu's "time spent at workplace locations" in anonymized Google mobility when discontinued in mid-October, 2022 (next slide)—no donuts (except for Krispee Kreme)

Working from home more enduring in daily smartphone mobility data on Oahu (office space, relatively) than on Maui (tourism, relatively)


Honolulu time spent at workplace locations compared to January 2020




Maui time spent at workplace locations compared to January 2020



Drop in Oahu existing home sales since 2021 from rising mortgage interest rates; bottom equals mid-2010s for condos, 2010 for SF




FOMC lowers fed funds rates in recessions, but not all fed funds rate increases *cause* recessions*: 2022-23 as 1994-95 Soft Landing?



*Ellen E. Meade, Yoshio Nozawa, Lubomir Petrasek, and Joyce K. Zickler (September 24, 2015), "The Effects of FOMC Communications before Policy Tightening in 1994 and 2004," FEDS Notes (https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/effects-of-fomc-communications-before-policy-tightening-in-1994-and-2004-20150924.html).

Generally tranquil character of 2010s expansion, low interest rate environment (= affordability) consistent with steady sales growth





TOP RATED REAL ESTATE COMPANY

Appeared on all four **Top 25** lists of:



- Top 25 Real Estate Companies in Hawaii
 - Top 25 Residential Sales in Hawaii
 - Top 25 Commercial Sales in Hawaii
 - Top 25 Vacant Land Sales in Hawaii


Pacific Business News rankings include appearances from 2016-present.

All information is approximate and subject to change. Luxury Homes International RB-18777


Remove the 4.7% sales growth trend, what's left either rate-driven, from exogenous shock (covid), or pre-pandemic (2019) stagnation



Total Oahu home sales volumes inverse movement with mortgage rates (lagged 2 months) suggest persistent low 2023 volumes




Recent credit tightening: increase in one version of the "external finance premium"—spread from mortgage rates to risk-free rates*



^{*}Ben Bernanke (December 2022), "Banking, credit, and economic fluctuations: Nobel Prize lecture" (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/12/12/banking-credit-and-economic-fluctuations-bernankes-nobel-prize-lecture) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBCp28YF-hg.

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


Impediment to Japanese travel revival:

At 145 ¥/\$, Hawaii is a very expensive destination for Japanese travelers

Historical relationship between yen/dollar exchange rate (*y*-axis) and Japanese visitor per person per day expenditure in Hawaii (2002-2019) implies low outlay in current exchange rate environment.

CPI inflation has fallen as fast as it rose, stabilizing—special factors: pandemic supply chain breaks, fiscal stimuli, geopolitical shocks



^{*}Federal Reserve Board (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf)

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
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
Contributions to PCE deflator headline inflation, divided into supplyand demand-driven, isolate *unexpected* component (not LR factors)

Percent changes stacked (in) U.S. headline PCE deflator components (year-over-year)




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The Fed's inflation goal: 2 percent core U.S. PCE inflation (AIT (2020)), but post-pandemic, core PCE inflation "sticky downward"




Why this is not the 1970s: (nominal minus real) U.S. Treasury yields: long-run inflation expectations $2.25\% \le \pi^e \le 2.50\%$ well-anchored




*Nominal U.S. Treasury yields minus TIPS yields at same maturities

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Quantitative tightening (Treasury, MBS run-off); SVB failure led to BTFP* for re-injection of bank reserves, reverse repos (liquidity)



U.S. Treasury yield curve: FOMC moved aggressively to contain inflation, anchor expectations; now approaching peak for disinflation




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


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
National economists largely agree on monetary policy, somewhat concerned that federal fiscal stimuli remain excessive (Aug 2023)




More than 2/3 of national economists somewhat to very confident of economic "Soft Landing" 1/3 of respondents less or not confident



Extrinsic risk (pandemic), intrinsic structural risk (tourism), COVID-19 hit NV, HI harder than other states—but why is Hawaii still a laggard?




Hawaii real GDP took economic growth off-ramp mid-2017, six years ago (pre-covid); real Hawaii output now 14-15 percent below potential



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Hawaii real GDP took economic growth off-ramp mid-2017, six years ago (pre-covid); real Hawaii output now 14-15 percent below potential



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
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No this is not about population: *per capita* real Hawaii GDP is now about 10% below its 2010s potential and 13% below U.S. actual

Thousand chained 2012 dollars of per capita GDP and mid- to late-2010s trends (log scale)*





^{*} Regressions on the stationary component (log changes) of per capita real GDP, 2014Q1 – 2018Q2

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
[†] Annualized quarterly growth rate 2022Q2 – 2023Q1


No this is not about population: *per capita* real Hawaii GDP is now about 10% below its 2010s potential and 13% below U.S. actual





Regressions on the stationary component (log changes) of per capita real GDP, 2014Q1 – 2018Q2






^{*} Regressions on the stationary component (log changes) of per capita real GDP, 2014Q1 – 2018Q2

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
[†] Annualized quarterly growth rate 2022Q2 – 2023Q1

Baby Boomers graduated in 1970s, returned when per capita Hawaii GDP 25-40% higher than U.S. average; today 10-15% lower: refund

Per capita GDP in thousand chained 2012 dollars



Hawaii per capita GDP as percent of U.S. average



Why commercial banks don't need as many economists: FOMC projections

$$\hat{y} = 1.0\% (2023), 1.8\% (LR)$$

$$\hat{p} = 3.2\% (2023), 2.0\% (LR)$$

$$i_{FF} = 5.6\% (2023), 2.5\% (LR)$$

Table 1. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents, under their individual assumptions of projected appropriate monetary policy, June 2023

Percent

	Median ¹				Central Tendency ²				Range <u>³</u>			
Variable	2023	2024	2025	Longer run	2023	2024	2025	Longer run	2023	2024	2025	Longer run
Change in real GDP	1.0	1.1	1.8	1.8	0.7–1.2	0.9–1.5	1.6–2.0	1.7–2.0	0.5–2.0	0.5–2.2	1.5–2.2	1.6–2.5
March projection	0.4	1.2	2 1.9	1.8	8.0-0.0	1.0–1.5	1.7–2.1	1.7–2.0	-0.2–1.3	0.3–2.0	1.5–2.2	1.6–2.5
Unemployment rate	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.0-4.3	4.3–4.6	4.3–4.6	3.8-4.3	3.9–4.5	4.0-5.0	3.8–4.9	3.5-4.4
March projection	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.0	4.0-4.7	4.3–4.9	4.3-4.8	3.8-4.3	3.9–4.8	4.0-5.2	3.8-4.9	3.5–4.7
PCE inflation	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.0	3.0-3.5	2.3–2.8	2.0-2.4	2.0	2.9–4.1	2.1–3.5	2.0-3.0	2.0
March projection	3.3	2.5	2.1	2.0	3.0-3.8	2.2–2.8	2.0-2.2	2.0	2.8–4.1	2.0-3.5	2.0-3.0	2.0
Core PCE inflation ⁴	3.9	2.6	2.2		3.7-4.2	2.5–3.1	2.0-2.4		3.6-4.5	2.2–3.6	2.0-3.0	
March projection	3.6	2.6	2.1		3.5–3.9	2.3–2.8	2.0-2.2		3.5–4.1	2.1–3.1	2.0-3.0	1
Memo: Projected appropriate policy path												
Federal funds rate	5.6	4.6	3.4	2.5	5.4-5.6	4.4–5.1	2.9-4.1	2.5–2.8	5.1–6.1	3.6-5.9	2.4-5.6	2.4–3.6
March projection	5.1	4.3	3.1	2.5	5.1–5.6	3.9–5.1	2.9–3.9	2.4–2.6	4.9–5.9	3.4–5.6	2.4–5.6	2.3–3.6

Note: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are percent changes from the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant's assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The projections for the federal funds rate are the value of the midpoint of the projected appropriate target range for the federal funds rate at the end of the specified calendar year or over the longer run. The March projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on March 21–22, 2023. One participant did not submit longer-run projections for the change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate in conjunction with the June 13–14, 2023, meeting, and one participant did not submit such projections in conjunction with the June 13–14, 2023, meeting.

- 1. For each period, the median is the middle projection when the projections are arranged from lowest to highest. When the number of projections is even, the median is the average of the two middle projections. Return to table
- 2. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year. Return to table
- 3. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants' projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year. Return to table
- 4. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected. Return to table

Hawaii's *real* economy is its own private Idaho—idiosyncratic—but U.S. asset markets arbitrage under perfect factor mobility

- Broader implication: current Hawaii real (under)performance is idiosyncratic systemic risk (but is that in your economic cost of capital?)
- Regardless of whether Hawaii is having a good or bad hair decade, the Interstate Commerce Clause guarantees perfect factor mobility—the U.S. is an economic union! (The EU wishes!)
 Labor, capital, technology, goods, services, information freely move about the economy
- Economic union means monetary union—your inflation cannot permanently deviate from the national average; your interest rates are the same up to idiosyncratic regional performance
- Small open economies take prices as given, exogenously, export in their comparative advantage, face unusual challenges establishing strategic advantage (i.e. first-mover, scalability, etc.)
- Doesn't mean you're not a player: the whole lesson from remote work/WFH is that you can be anywhere—anywhere is everywhere
- Tourism hang-up? Does Disney, as does the Hawaii Tourism Authority, seek to "decrease the total number of visitors to Oahu [*Disneyland*]?" (Official Hawaii policy.*) No: Disney deploys better apps to manage volumes and leverages merch and content exports *to you…forever*.



Tourism in Oahu economy

Billion current dollars or as noted; blanks unavailable	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
GDP: Honolulu (Oahu)	\$67.008	\$67.682	\$61.769	\$67.383	
Total visitor expenditure	\$7.969	\$8.140		\$5.709	\$8.517
Tourism Price Index (2017 = 100)	103.9	105.7	106.7	121.9	133.8
Urban Hawaii CPI-U (1982-84 = 100)	277.078	281.585	286.008	296.818	316.076
Real Oahu tourism receipts (TPI), billion 2022\$	\$10.262	\$10.304		\$6.266	\$8.517
Real Oahu tourism receipts (CPI-U), billion 2022\$	\$9.091	\$9.137		\$6.079	\$8.517
Ratio of nominal tourism receipts/GDP	11.9%	12.0%		8.5%	
Oahu tourism share of economy*	9.5%	9.6%		6.8%	

^{*}Does not use Dr. Tian's calculation methodology applied to the Hawaii Intercounty Input-Output Model but, instead, applies the 80 percent statewide ratio of tourism direct and indirect effects to nominal total visitor expenditures to Oahu total visitor expenditures and divides by nominal GDP for Honolulu County.

Tourism in Maui County economy

Billion current dollars or as noted; blanks unavailable	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
GDP: Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI (Metropolitan Statistical Area)	\$10.443	\$10.872	\$8.750	\$10.356	
Total visitor expenditure	\$5.002	\$5.128		\$4.043	\$5.690
Tourism Price Index (2017 = 100)	103.9	105.7	106.7	121.9	133.8
Urban Hawaii CPI-U (1982-84 = 100)	277.078	281.585	286.008	296.818	316.076
Real Maui tourism receipts (TPI), billion 2022\$	\$6.442	\$6.491		\$4.438	\$5.690
Real Maui tourism receipts (CPI-U), billion 2022\$	\$5.706	\$5.756		\$4.305	\$5.690
Ratio of nominal tourism receipts/GDP	47.9%	47.2%		39.0%	
Maui tourism share of economy*	38.3%	37.7%		31.2%	

^{*}Does not use Dr. Tian's calculation methodology applied to the Hawaii Intercounty Input-Output Model but, instead, applies the 80 percent statewide ratio of tourism direct and indirect effects to nominal total visitor expenditures to Maui County total visitor expenditures and divides by nominal GDP for Maui County.

Tourism in Big Island economy

Billion current dollars or as noted; blanks unavailable	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Big Island	\$8.719	\$9.027	\$8.313	\$9.187	
Total visitor expenditure	\$2.326	\$2.326		\$1.837	\$2.675
Tourism Price Index (2017 = 100)	103.9	105.7	106.7	121.9	133.8
Urban Hawaii CPI-U (1982-84 = 100)	277.078	281.585	286.008	296.818	316.076
Real Big Island tourism receipts (TPI), billion 2022\$	\$2.995	\$2.944		\$2.017	\$2.675
Real Big Island tourism receipts (CPI-U), billion 2022\$	\$2.653	\$2.611		\$1.956	\$2.675
Ratio of nominal tourism receipts/GDP	26.7%	25.8%		20.0%	
Big Island tourism share of economy*	21.3%	20.6%		16.0%	

^{*}Does not use Dr. Tian's calculation methodology applied to the Hawaii Intercounty Input-Output Model but, instead, applies the 80 percent statewide ratio of tourism direct and indirect effects to nominal total visitor expenditures to Big Isle total visitor expenditures and divides by nominal GDP for Hawaii County.

Sources:

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-county-metro-and-other-areas

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?r9

Hawaii DBEDT https://dbedt.hawaii.gov/visitor/tourism/

https://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/visitor/tourism/2022/Dec%202022.xlsx


https://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/visitor/tourism/2019/Dec19.xls

https://dbedt.hawaii.gov/visitor/tourism-price-index/

Eugene Tian, James Mak, and PingSun Leung, "The direct and indirect contributions of tourism to regional GDP: Hawaii," *UHERO Working Paper* No. 2011-5 (July 28, 2011) (http://www.uhero.hawaii.edu/assets/WP 2011-5.pdf).

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
Pre-pandemic distribution of U.S. workers who worked at home and how often, 2017-2018: almost 90% never or almost never WFH



Hawaii International Real Estate Council



Proportions of Hawaii WFH—full-time and hybrid—and in-person in workplace steady, 2022-23 Census Bureau Household Pulse Surveys




Hysteresis: changes thought temporary which are permanent

- WFH around the world: pandemic = simultaneous, unplanned, universal shift in working arrangements
 - Hybrid WFH: 1.5 days/week (27 country sample); workers want 1.7 days, firms want 0.7 days
 - WFH 2-3 days/week option value = 5% of pay; higher for women (6%), parents, long commuters
- "We're not going to go back to normal because the changes already are noticeably permanent in certain areas. That's what our surveys...are beginning to shed light on this—I don't what to call it—maybe it's The New Economy" (William Beach, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner)
- "...[in surveys] the near- and medium-term effect on firm-level TFP [total factor productivity] was more likely to be positive for firms where more of the work can be done from home, and where sales do not depend as much on face-to-face contact with customers." (John Fernald, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Professor, INSEAD)


Sources: Cevat Giray Aksoy et al (August 2022), "Working from home around the world," prepared for the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (https://wfhresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Working-from-Home-Around-the-World-23-August-2022.pdf), Nicholas Bloom et al (July 2022) "How hybrid working from home works out," NBER Working Paper 30292 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w30292); comments of William Beach, Commissioner, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Association for Business Economics 2021 Economic Measurement Seminar (August 9-11, 2021), 31:41 of panel discussion on "Maintaining the Quality and Integrity of U.S. Government Data" (August 11, 2021); John Fernald and Huiyu Li (August 8, 2022) "The Impact of COVID on Productivity and Potential Output" (https://www.kansascityfed.org/Jackson%20Hole/documents/9032/JH_Paper_Fernald.pdf), presented at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium: Reassessing Constraints on the Economy and Policy (Thursday, August 25, 2022),

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
Hawaii statewide remote work and working from home by income: to the extent productivity drives income it raises odds of remote/WFH




Hawaii statewide remote work and working from home by educational attainment: human capital prevalence in IT, STEM, professions




Hawaii statewide remote work and working from home by age cohort: more Millennials than Boomers working remotely (latter at Wal-Mart)




Hawaii statewide remote work and WFH by household size: U-shaped pattern, larger households more likely; largest, smallest less likely



Hawaii statewide remote work and WFH by gender and presence of children in household: hybrid arrangements provide flexibility






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Remote work and working from home (WFH) inferences from Hawaii census data with fairly stable proportions, December 2022 – May 2023


- Remote work/WFH associated with higher incomes,
- with higher educational attainment,
- more with younger than with older workers,
- more with larger households, less with largest and smallest households.
- Presence of children associated with more hybrid but not more full-time remote work/WFH.
- Slightly more women exercise hybrid options; slightly more men overall remote and WFH.

Pandemic may have aftered Oahu commuting by: (1) shrinking the economy; (2) increasing WFH; 3-min. shorter and later commutes




Daily Google smartphone mobility data (pau Oct 2022): Hawaii residents spend 30 percent less time in workplaces, post-vaxx


Google smartphone GPS mobility indexes for Hawaii residents, relative to January 2020



First round v. second round impacts: less time in workplace means fewer stops at day-care, mall, restaurant, gym—spillover impacts



Applications for federal EIN, a business formation measure, took a huge leap after the pandemic, as if a permanent structural change



The series correspond to a subset of all applications for an Employer Identification Number (EIN) excluding applications for tax liens, estates, trusts, certain financial filings, applications outside of the 50 states and DC or with no state-county geocodes, applications with certain NAICS codes in sector 11 (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting) or 92 (public administration) that have low transition rates, and applications in certain industries (e.g. private households, civic and social organizations). Slide copyright 2023 TZ E, C NO N TO M TI C, S'

Remote work, working from home (WFH), vagabond workers, and Hawaii post-covid housing and commercial real estate

- Pre-pandemic, < 4 percent full-time WFH, ≤ 7 percent hybrid WFH in U.S.</p>
- Now, 20-25 percent of Hawaii workers are in hybrid or full-time WFH arrangements (half:half)
- Higher on mainland (Hawaii on threshold of bottom ten states between WV, SD, for full-time WFH)
- Years starting in April 2019 (pre-covid, pre-vaxx, post-vaxx, high interest rates):
 - 1. Oahu SF home demand surged after covid, condo demand stayed on-trend
 - 2. Donut Effect in Oahu suburbs and exurbs, and in Zoomtowns (Maui, Kona-Kohala are California Zoomtowns where *both* single-family *and* condo prices surged (latter in resorts)
 - 3. Backwash in 2022: Triumph of the City—lower relative condo prices sustained Oahu demand
- Secondary effects:
 - 1. Decreased demand for CRE especially office space, retail anchors, strip malls
 - 2. Associated rise in e-commerce, BOPIS, new business formation (virtual), food delivery, etc.
 - 3. Cutbacks in food services, personal services, etc.

Urban spatial equilibrium has been altered, slightly flattening valuation gradients

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